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Abstract:  
According to a list of the 200 most highly-paid chief executives at the largest U.S. public 
companies in 2013, Oracle’s Lawrence J. Ellison remained the best paid CEO and earned 
$96.2 million as total annual compensation last year. He has received $1.8 billion over the 
past 20 years. The lowest paid on the same list is General Motors’ D. F. Akerson who earned 
$11.1 million. The average national pay for a non-supervisory US worker was $51,200 last year 
and a CEO made 354 times more than an average worker in 2012. Hunter Harrison, Canadian 
Pacific Railway Ltd., was the best paid CEO in Canada for 2012 and received $49.2-million as 
total annual compensation, significantly higher than the 2011 best paid CEO, Magna’s F. 
Stronach who received $40.9 million. In 2011, the average annual salary was $45,488 and 
Canada’s top 50 CEOs earned 235 times more than the average Canadian. These executive 
pay practices contrast with the growing inequality in Canada, recently illustrated with the 
finding that 40% of Indigenous children live in poverty. In contrast, Japan’s highest paid CEO 
is Nissan Motor Co.’s Carlos Ghosn who earned 988 million yen (US$10.1 million) in the year 
ended March 2013, little changed from the previous year and modestly improved from his 
US$ 9.5 million compensation for 2009. That does not even put him among the top 200 most 
highly-paid U.S. company chiefs and the top 20 best paid CEOs in Canada for 2012. Why are 
Japanese CEOs paid considerably less than their American or Canadian counterparts? This 
essay argues that the activism of long-term oriented institutional investors such as banks 
and the tying of executive pay to worker welfare in the context of a culture of intolerance to 
excessive executive compensation explain to a great extent the development of a pattern of 
low executive pay in Japan despite the recent weakening of bank monitoring as a result of 
the adoption of U.S. governance style in some Japanese companies. The Japanese 
experience also demonstrates that lower executive compensation does not result in 
compromising firm performance and is a necessary condition to build a stakeholder-friendly 
corporation. For example, the CEO of Toyota (world’s biggest automaker), Akio Toyoda, 
earned 184 million yen ($1.9 million) in 2012, a 35 percent increase from the previous year. He 
is the lowest-paid chief of the world’s five biggest automakers and led Toyota to generate 
the highest return last year among the top five global automakers. Toyota’s outlook for 
increasing profit prompted the automaker to approve the biggest bonus for workers in the 
last years. Alan Mulally, Ford Motor’s chief and the best paid among the top five, took home 
$21 million in 2012. 
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WHY  DOES  EXECUTIVE  GREED  PREVAIL  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  
CANADA  BUT  NOT  IN  JAPAN?  
The  Pattern  of  Low  CEO  Pay  and  High  Worker  Welfare  in  Japanese  Corporations  




According   to   a   list   of   the   200   most   highly-­paid   chief   executives   at   the   largest   U.S.   public   companies   in   2013,  
last  year.  He  has  received  $1.8  billion  over  the  past  20  years.  The  lowe
F.  Akerson  who  earned  $11.1  million.  The  average  national  pay  for  a  non-­supervisory  US  worker  was  $51,200  last  
year  and  a  CEO  made  354  times  more  than  an  average  worker  in  2012.  Hunter  Harrison,  Canadian  Pacific  Railway  
Ltd.,   was   the   best   paid   CEO   in   Canada   for   2012   and   received   $49.2-­million   as   total   annual   compensation,  
average  annual  salary  was  $45,
These  executive  pay  practices  contrast  with  the  growing  inequality  in  Canada,  recently  illustrated  with  the  finding  
that  40%  of  Indigenous  children  live  in  poverty.  In  contrast,   Carlos 
Ghosn   who   earned   988   million   yen   (US$10.1   million)   in   the   year   ended   March   2013,   little   changed   from   the  
previous  year  and  modestly  improved  from  his  US$  9.5  million  compensation  for  2009.  That  does  not  even  put  him  
among  the  top  200  most  highly-­paid  U.S.  company  chiefs  and  the  top  20  best  paid  CEOs  in  Canada  for  2012.  Why  
are  Japanese  CEOs  paid  considerably  less  than  their  American  or  Canadian  counterparts?  This  essay  argues  that  
the   activism  of   long-­term  oriented   institutional   investors   such  as   banks   and   the   tying   of   executive   pay   to  worker  
welfare  in  the  context  of  a  culture  of  intolerance  to  excessive  executive  compensation  explain  to  a  great   extent  the  
development  of  a  pattern  of  low  executive  pay  in  Japan  despite  the  recent  weakening  of  bank  monitoring  as  a  result  
of  the  adoption  of  U.S.  governance  style  in  some  Japanese  companies.  The  Japanese  experience  also  demonstrates  
that  lower  executive  compensation  does  not  result  in  compromising  firm  performance  and  is  a  necessary  condition  
to   build   a   stakeholder-­
Toyoda,   earned   184  million   yen   ($1.9  million)   in   2012,   a   35   percent   increase   from   the   previous   year.   He   is   the  
lowest-­
  the  automaker  to  approve  the  




Executive compensation has become a very pressing issue in the mid of the economic 
crisis, failing corporate governance systems and growing income inequalities in rich, 
-yet-unsolved problems today is executive 
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3 Executive compensation is widely 
perceived as abusive and grossly excessive and an important factor in expanding the unfair 
distribution of wealth. Among the 200 most highly-paid chief executives at the largest U.S. 
 is the best paid CEO and earned $96.2 million as 
total annual compensation in 2012.4 He has received $1.8 billion over the past 20 years.5 The 
made 354 times more than an average worker in 2012.6  
 
Hunter Harrison, who received $49.2-million as total annual compensation, significantly higher 
ch who received $40.9 million. In 2011, the 
average Canadian worker.7 These executive pay practices contrast with the growing inequality. 
Canada ranks 25th among the 30 countries in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
                                                          
 
 
3 BEBCHUK AND FRIED,THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004), 189. 
4 Karl Russell, Executive  Pay  by  the  Numbers.  Here  are  the  200  most  highly-­paid  chief  executives  at  U.S.  public  
companies  in  2013, EQUILAR, NEW YORK TIMES, June 29, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/06/30/business/executive-compensation-tables.html?_r=0. 
5 SARAH ANDERSON, SCOTT KLINGER & SAM PIZZIGATI, EXECUTIVE EXCESS 2013: BAILED OUT, 
BOOTED, AND BUSTED. A 20- -PAID CEOS (2013). 
6 Ibid. 
7 CANADIAN CENTRE FOR POLICY ALTERNATIVES, OVER-COMPENSATING: EXECUTIVE PAY IN 



















Development with regard to child poverty. The average child poverty rate for all children in 
Canada is 17% while 40% of Indigenous children live in poverty.8 
 
A remarkable move forward is needed in order to narrow the gap that executive 
compensation creates within companies and society at large. The failures of existing corporate 
problems of executive compe 9 The 
inability of modern corporate governance mechanisms to control excessive executive 
compensation and monitor self-interested and self-indulgent executives has become evident 
around the world. The problems of executive compensation can be fully addressed by adopting 
reforms that would confront corporate governance ideals with a different set of incentives, 
structures and objectives.10 Some lessons can be learned from comparative studies of corporate 
governance systems. 
 
Japan has developed a pattern of low executive pay.11 For example, the highest paid CEO 
                                                          
8 DAVID MACDONALD & DANIEL WILSON, POVERTY OR PROSPERITY. INDIGENOUS CHILDREN IN 
CANADA (2013), available at: 
http://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/National%20Office/2013/06/Poverty_or_ 
Prosperity_Indigenous_Children.pdf 
9 BEBCHUK et al, supra note 3. 
10 Ibid. 
11 See e.g. Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Corporate  Governance  and  Executive  Compensation:  

















ended March 2013,12 little changed from the previous year and modestly improved from his US$ 
9.5 million compensation for 2009. That does not even put him among the top 200 most highly-
paid U.S. company chiefs and the top 20 best paid CEOs in Canada for 2012. Japanese executive 
compensation practices have thus diverged from the West and it is important to explore the 
reasons for such low CEO pay pattern. This paper discusses executive compensation in Japan 
from a comparative perspective and highlights some of facts and reasons that may account for 
the development of the Japanese pattern of low executive pay while maintaining high levels of 
efficiency and competitiveness. It argues that the activism of long-term oriented institutional 
investors such as banks and the informal tying of executive pay to worker welfare in the context 
of a culture of intolerance to excessive executive compensation to a great extent explain the 
development of a pattern of low executive pay in Japan. The Japanese experience also 
demonstrates that lower executive compensation does not result in compromising firm 
performance and is a necessity to build a stakeholder-friendly corporation. The paper begins with 
a quick overview of the corporate governance context of executive pay in Japan and the West. It 
then briefly reviews executive compensation practices in Japan, Canada and the United States 
and suggests that managers can be highly competitive with lower compensations as demonstrated 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Performance:  A  Comparison  of  Japan  and  the  United  States, 102 J. Pol. Econ. 510 (1994) (finding that Japanese 
executives own less stock and receive lower cash compensation than U.S. executives). 
12 Anna Mukai & Horie Masatsugu, Toyota  President  Delivers  Highest  Returns  For  Lowest  Pay, BLOOMBERG, 


















in Japan. The last section is central and examines the corporate governance reasons that may 
account for the Japanese pattern of low executive compensation. 
 
CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE  AND  EXECUTIVE  COMPENSATION   IN   JAPAN  AND  
THE  WEST  IN  A  NUTSHELL    
Organizing and governing a corporation in capitalist societies have always been a 
challenging task for business leaders, policy-makers and academics. Some practices appear to be 
business, investments occurring outside the company became the norm, and most importantly 
directors/management gained increased power over operations, as well as strong support from 
13 
management under a board structure, shared ownership by investors of capital, and limited 
liability of owners and management are considered the common characteristics that structure the 
modern corporation.14 This description of the corporation seems to be the consensus across 
countries. 
 
Yet, the divergence in corporate governance becomes quite evident once the attention is 
drawn to countries with cultural differences that utilize distinctly different business practices 
                                                          
13 DAVID KORTEN & TEDNACE, GANGS OF AMERICA (2003), chapter 1 at 2.  
14 Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, The  End  of  History  for  Corporate  Law, 89 GEORGETOWN LAW 

















such as Japan. As known, Western nations such as Canada and the United States constitute 
liberal market economies whereas Japan recognizes a more coordinated market approach. Within 
a liberal market economy, all coordination problems between firms, financiers, employees and 
other participants are largely handled through market incentives or free market mechanisms.15 
On the other hand, coordinated market economies rather depend heavily on non-market 
relationships within formal institutions and long term objectives.16 Specifically, Japanese firms 
tend to embody more of a total package organization and are committed to their long-term 
sustainability.  
 
Companies in the West often embody a short term, top down mindset which can go a 
how much money they can make right now and not one that looks at how decisions affect the 
embrace a long- 17 Positions, bonuses and general operations are based on this 
e United States and Canada, corporate 
governance is concerned with ensuring the firm run in the interests of shareholders and that its 
                                                          
15 PETER HALL & DAVID SOSKICE, AN INTRODUCTION TO VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM; FROM 
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
(2001) at 8.  
16 Ibid at 8 

















18 This fundamental idea is also entrenched within the 
legal framework of both countries, notably through strong fiduciary duties designed largely to 
maximize shareholder value.19 
 
Generally, three elements characterize the Japanese corporate governance model: main 
bank capital markets, keiretsu cross-holdings, and insider boards of directors.20 
lending is crucial and the Japanese financial system is classified as bank-centered due to the 
predominance of corporate borrowings from a centrally designated bank, called the main bank. 
This main bank acts as the leader in monit 21 One 
of the advantages gained from the main bank is that it may operate as a mediator towards any 
outside market influences or tendencies. The keiretsu is an industrial group whose member firms 
are bound by long term cross-shareholdings and maintain strong business and financial ties.22 
The keiretsu system effectively eliminates the misrepresentation of management found in 
Western corporations by having strong monitoring mechanisms. By pooling voting rights, the 
keiretsu has control over member managers and ensures that none behave opportunistically or 
                                                          
18 Alan Franklin & Zhao Mengxin, The  Corporate  Governance  Model  of  Japan:  Shareholders  are  not  Rulers, 
University of Pennsylvania, 1-19, 2 (2007), available at: 
http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~allenf/download/Vita/Japan-Corporate-Governance.pdf. 
19 Ibid at2. 
20 HUONG HIGGINS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN: ROLE OF BANKS, KEIRETSU AND 
JAPANESE TRADITIONS; FROM THE GOVERNANCE OF EAST ASIAN CORPORATIONS: POST ASIAN 
FINANCIAL CRISIS (2004) at 96; Basu, Hwang, Mitsudome & Weintrop, Corporate  Governance,  Top  Executive  
Compensation,  and  Firm  Performance  in  Japan, 15 (1) PACIFIC-BASIN FINANCE JOURNAL 56, 58-60 (2007). 
21 HIGGINS, supra note 20, at 98. 

















collude operations.23 Firms that belong to the keiretsu are essentially bound together by a series 
of connected contracts which maintain the crucial business relationships that are required. 
Japanese boards are divided into a hierarchical structure based on promotion from within the 
bank.24 
 
It is important to note that, after the deregulation of the financial systems and corporate 
-
shareholding25 and the Commercial Code in 2003 allowed Japanese firms to adopt a new board 
system with three committees (auditing, nomination and compensation) similar to the Western 
systems26 and the majority of the committee members should be outside directors27.  However, 
recent studies indicate that internationally exposed, more experienced and highly cross-held 
                                                          
23 Basu, Hwang, Mitsudome & Weintrop, supra note 20, at 59. 
24 HIGGINS, supra note 20. 
25 T. Hoshi, & A. Kashyap, Will  the  U.S.  bank  recapitalization  succeed?  Eight  lessons  from  Japan. 97 JOURNAL 
OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 398 (2010); Hideaki Sakawa, Keisuke Moriyama & Naoki Watanabel, Relation  
between  Top  Executive  Compensation  Structure  and  Corporate  Governance:  Evidence  from  Japanese  Public  
Disclosed  Data, 20(6) CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 593, 594 (2012). 
26 Sakawa, Moriyama & Watanabel, supra note 25 , at 594-595; Toru Yoshikawa & Jean McGuire, Change  and  
Continuity  in  Japanese  Corporate  Governance, 25 ASIA PACIFIC JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT 5, 14 
(2008)(also noting that if a company chooses a committee structure, it is required to have three committees, i.e., a 
nominating committee, an audit committee and a compensation committee);S.H. Goo & Fidy Xiangxing Hong, The  
Curious  Model  of  Internal  Monitoring  Mechanisms  of  Listed  Corporations  in  China:  The  Sinonisation  Process, 12 
(3) EUROPEAN BUSINESS ORGANIZATION LAW REVIEW 469, 507 (2011).  
27 Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Choice  As  Regulatory  Reform:  The  Case  of  Japanese  Corporate  


















firms, with higher foreign ownership, are more likely to adopt the committee system.28 On the 
other hand, firms with larger proportions of bank ownership are to some extent negatively 
associated with the adoption of the committee system.29 As a result, the traditional monitoring of 
firms by banks appears to be declining.30 This process of corporate governance reforms suggests 
that, in terms of executive compensation decisions, Japanese corporations may be making a slow 
transition from the old way of approving self-proposed executive compensation at the annual 
meeting of shareholders31 to compensation committee determination. 
 
 
JAPANESE  EXECUTIVE  COMPENSATION  IN  COMPARATIVE  PERSPECTIVE 
Compensation levels in Canada and the United States have been on the rise since 2001, where 
increases in real terms of 285% and 370% from the years ranging 1993-2001 have been 
documented.32 A higher proportion of bonuses and stock options are particularly evident in 
United States. Gathering information from base salaries, annual bonuses, long term incentive 
                                                          
28 Amon Chizema & Yoshikatsu Shinozawa,   
Corporate  Governance?, 49 (1) JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES 77 (2012). 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Hideaki Sakawa & Naoki Watanabel, Executive  Compensation  and  Firm  Performance  in  Japan:  The  Role  of  
Keiretsu  Memberships  and  Bank-­Appointed  Monitors, 9 (8) JOURNAL OF MODERN ACCOUNTING AND 
AUDITING 1119, 1120 (2013). 

















plans and stock options from both a Canadian and United States perspective reveals just how 
deep the gap is: 
  
-­2009)33  




Blackstone Group L.P.          Stephen Schwarzman                                   $702,440,573 million                                                  
Oracle  Corporation                 Lawrence Ellison                                        $556,976,600 million                                                  
Occidental Petroleum                  Ray Irani                                                 $222,639,705 million                                                            
Hess  Corp.                                   John Hess                                                $159,566,940 million                                                         
Ultra  Petroleum                        Michael Watford                                        $116,929,392 million                                                                   
Chesapeake  Energy                 Aubrey McClendon                                     $114,286,867 million                                                       
XTO  Energy                                Bob Simpson                                           $103,485,972 million                                                                  
EOG  Resources  Inc.                    Mark Papa                                               $90, 471, 784 million                                                               
Nabors  Industries  Ltd.              Eugene Isenberg                                         $79,333,079 million                                                             
Abercrombie  &  Fitch                      Michael Jeffries                                          $71,795,744 million 
  
According to a list of the 200 most highly-paid chief executives at the largest U.S. public 
million as total annual compensation last year.34 He has received $1.8 billion over the past 20 
                                                          
33 Andy Burt, U.S.  Top  Ten  Highest  Paid  CEOs  of  2008, BLOOMBERG, 2008, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aeN1uFdDx3KA  


















million. The top ten highest-paid CEOs on that list are as follows: 
  
  the  U.S.A.  for  201236  
Company  Name                                                              CEO  Name                                                                  Total  Realized  Compensation                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
  
  
Oracle    Lawrence J. Ellison   $96.2 million 
Activision Blizzard  Robert A. Kotick   $64.9 million 
CBS    Leslie Moonves   $60.3 million 
Discovery Communications David M. Zaslav   $49.9 million 
Level 3 Communications James Q. Crowe   $40.7 million 
HCA    Richard M. Bracken   $38.6 million 
Walt Disney   Robert A. Iger    $37.1 million 
Nuance Communications Paul A. Ricci    $37.1 million 
Yahoo    Marissa A. Mayer   $36.6 million 
Nike    Mark G. Parker   $35.2 million 
 
In Canada, Hunter Harrison, Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd., was the best paid CEO for 
2012 and received $49.2-million as total annual compensation, significantly higher than the 2011 
even in 2009, the worse year of the economic recession in Canada: 
  
                                                          
35 Anderson, Klinger & Pizzigati,  supra note 5. 


















Company  Name                                                                      CEO  Name                                                                                            Total    Compensation                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
  
  
Barrick  Gold  Corp.                                                          Aaron  Regent                                                                                $24,217,040                                                                                                                                          
Canadian  National  Railway  Co.                  Hunter  Harrison                                                                      $17,343,160                                                                                                                                            
Onex  Corp.                                                                                    Gerald  Schwartz                                                                    $16,689,758                                                                                                                                                      
Toronto  Dominion  Bank                                          Edmund  Clark                                                                            $15,188,391                                                                                                                                                                    
Rogers  Communications  Inc.                            Nadir  Mohamed                                                                    $13,687,699                                                                                                                                                  
Gammon  Gold  Inc.                                                            Fred  George                                                                                $13,061,177                                                                                                                                                                      
Niko  Resources  Ltd.                                                        Edward  Sampson                                                                  $12,949,343                                                                                                                                                                  
Royal  Bank  of  Canada                                                  Gordon  Nixon                                                                          $12,095,885                                                                                                                                                          
Shaw  Communications  Inc.                                  Jim  Shaw                                                                                          $11,557,119                                                                                                                                                      
Yamana  Gold  Inc.                                                                Peter  Marrone                                                                          $11,534,588              
 
38 
Company  Name                                                                      CEO  Name                                                                Total  Compensation                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
Magna    Frank Stronach   40,984,820 
                        (Ex-Chair/Ex-CEO) 
Valeant Pharmaceuticals Int.  Michael Pearson     36,308,716  
Pretium Resources Inc.  Robert A. Quartermain   16,908,729  
Shaw Communications Inc.  Bradley Shaw    15,851,336  
Dundee Corp.    Ned Goodman    15,037,835  
                                                          
37 HUGH MACKENZIE, RECESSION-  (2011), available at: 
http://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/National%20Office/2011/01/Recession%20
Proof.pdf 

















Suncor Energy Inc.  Rick George    14,857,818  
Magna International Inc.  Donald Walker   14,836,948  
Onex Corp.    Gerald Schwartz   14,133,703  
Ivanhoe Mines Ltd.  Robert Friedland   12,574,305  
Yamana Gold Inc   Peter Marrone    12,416,999 
  
39 
Company  Name                                                                      CEO  Name                                                                Total  Compensation                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd. Hunter Harrison  $49.2-million 
Thomson Reuters Corp.  James Smith   $18.8-million 
Talisman Energy Inc.   John Manzoni   $18.7-million 
Eldorado Gold Corp.   Paul Wright   $18.7-million 
Magna International Inc.  Donald Walker  $16.9-million 
Open Text Corp.   Mark Barrenechea  $14.8-million 
Royal Bank of Canada  Gordon Nixon   $13.7-million 
Onex Corp.    Gerald Schwartz  $13.3-million 
Catamaran Corp.   Mark Thierer   $12.9-million 
Yamana Gold Inc.   Peter Marrone   $12.1-million 
 
This quick data shows that excessiveness have been dominating executive compensation 
practices in the United States and Canada even during one of the worst economic recessions. It 
also raises serious concerns about the effectiveness of disclosure and monitoring mechanisms 
designed to control excessive compensation in the West. Even with the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) having precise requirements on the mandatory disclosure of the highest paid 
                                                          



















corporate officers and their corporate holdings, efforts have still fallen short in facilitating any 
change to how complex compensation packages are rendered.40 Additionally, a number of public 
web based disclosure sites have been initiated in Canada (sedar.com) and the United States 
(edgar.com) which contain all mandatory annual reports which present company, director and 
management based financial information. Without question the bulk of the disparity regarding 
CEO compensation rests within the United States. Canadian executive pay is also quite 
unwarranted and creates a rather ominous situation. The economy overall is not constructed to 
work at its ideal level when enormous compensation packages are handed out to a fraction of 
41 
ld accept the high pay levels of the United States and Canadian executives if 
42 
However, Japan has developed a pattern of low executive pay and has then made the 
excessiveness of executive pay and the wage disparities of the West more evident. The following 
data shows that Japan has maintained lower compensation levels over the last 20 years: 
Table  6:  International  Comparison  of  CEO  Pay43  
                                                          
40 Benjamin Alarie, Executive  Compensation  and  Tax  Policy:  Lessons  for  Canada  from  the  Experience  of  the  United  
, 61 (1) UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO FACULTY OF LAW REVIEW39 (2003). 
41 Ibid. at71. 
42 GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS(1991), at 204. 

















Country                                  Average  CEO  Pay  (1988)        Average  CEO  Pay  (2003)      Foreign  CEO  Pay  Relative  to  U.S.    
  
  
Japan                             $437,655                         $456,937                                    20%                                                                                                                                                                                   
(65% Taxed Income)                                                   (-4% Change) 
Canada             $398,946                           $889,898                                    45%                                 
                                                   (123% Change)                                                                              
United States                $759,043                          $2,249,080                                 100%                            
                                                   (196% Change) 
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Carlos Ghosn                  Nissan  Motor  Co.                                 891      $9.5 (million) 
Howard Stringer             Sony  Corp.                                            815      $8.7 (million)                        
Yoshitoshi Kitajima       Dai  Nippon  Printing  Co.                      787                $8.4 (million)          
Banjiro Uemura             Tohokushinsha  Film  Corp.                   675                $7.2 (million) 
Alan MacKenzie            Takeda  Pharmaceutical  Co.                 553                $5.9 (million) 
Chihiro Kanagawa         Shin-­Etsu  Chemical  Co.                       535                 $5.7(million) 
Reiji Hosoya                  Futaba  Corp.                                        517                 $5.5 (million) 
Hiroshi Mitsuhara         Nihon  Chouzai  Co.                                477                 $5.1(million) 
Hajime Satomi              Sega  Sammy  Holdings  Inc.                    435                 $4.6 (million) 
Shigetaka Komori         Fujifilm  Holdings  Corp.                        361                 $3.8 (million) 
 
("Total" figure includes salary, bonus, options, retirement, and other benefits) 
                                                          
44 Taku Kato & Minh Bui, , 


















Note.- We have converted Japanese yens to US dollars based on the rate of 93.5 yens per 1 US dollar for 
2009 following W. Antweiler.45 
 
Recent data further confirms such a pattern of low executive pay in Japan. Nissan Motor 
Carlos Ghosn 
(US$10.1 million) in the year ended March 2013.46 His compensation little changed from the 
previous year and modestly improved from his US$9.8 million compensation in 201047 and US$ 
note that the median executive among Japan's 269 most highly paid managers earned 
approximately $1.48 million in total compensation for 2010 whereas the median manager's total 
compensation was approximately $16.7 million among the 269 most highly paid executives in 
the United States in 2010.48 
among the top 200 most highly-paid U.S. company chiefs for 201349 and the top 20 best paid 
 Akio Toyoda, reportedly 
earned 184 million yen ($1.9 million) in 2012 and is the lowest-
biggest automakers.50 
                                                          
45 Werner Antweiler, Foreign  Currency  Units  per  1  U.S.  Dollar,  1948-­2011. PACIFIC Exchange Rate Service, 
UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (2012), available at: http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/etc/USDpages.pdf. 
46 Mukai & Masatsugu, supra note 11. 
47 Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Curtis J. Milhaupt, supra note 11, at 134. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Russell, supra note 4. 

















top five, taking home $21 million in 201251 whereas 11.1 
million in 2012.52 
five automakers,53 yet he earned less than one- -
tenth of General Motors  
  Part of the explanation for lower compensation levels in Japan vis-a-vis United States 
and Canada lies in the use of, or the lack thereof, stock options. These stock option components 
within compensation packages have without question become the single most important element 
of any Western executive pay plan. Stock options represent over 140% of the base salary in the 
United States and Canada while Japan sits at a stingy 13%.54 More recent studies indicate that 
the base salary often represents about 70 percent of Japanese executive compensation packages 
and the incentive plans, excluding cash bonuses, account for only 17 percent.55 This is consistent 
with the fact that share ownership by top executives has not been a prominent feature of 
executive compensation or traditional corporate governance mechanisms in Japan.56 Stock 
options are a relatively new component introduced into the Japanese corporate world and until 
                                                          
51 Ibid. 
52 Russell, supra note 4. 
53 Mukai & Masatsugu, supra note 11. 
54 Gregory Jackson, THE ORIGINS OF NON-LIBERAL CAPITALISM: GERMANY AND JAPAN IN 
COMPARISON (2001) atpp. 121- -Liberal Corporate Governance in Germany and 
 
55 WATSON WYATT WORLD, EXECUTIVE PAY PRACTICE AROUND THE WORLD (2009); Robert J. 
Jackson, Jr. & Curtis J. Milhaupt, supra note 11, at 114 (finding that the structure of executive pay in Japan relies 
heavily on payments unrelated to performance such as salary). 
56 N. Abe, N. Gaston & K. Kubo, Executive  pay  in  Japan:  The  role  of  bank-­appointed  monitors  and  the  main  bank  
relationship, 17 (3) JAPAN AND THE WORLD ECONOMY 371, 386 (2005); Steven N. Kaplan, supra note 11. 

















recently they did not make much use of them.57 Only after the 1997 amendment to the Japanese 
Commercial Code, it became legally possible to grant stock options.58 Moreover, disclosure 
levels had not been seen as necessary due to the lower compensation levels of top Japanese 
management. Only recently, on  March  31,  2010  the  Cabinet  Office  Ordinance  on  Disclosure  of  
Corporate  Affairs,  etc.  was  amended  to  require  companies  to  disclose  the  total  amount  of  
directors'  remuneration,  total  amount  by  category  and  total  amount  of  remuneration  of  officers  
whose  remuneration  exceeds  100  million  yen59  (approximately  $1  million).60  . However, only 
152 Japanese public companies disclosed that their 269 executives earned more than 100 million 
yen in 2009.61 
. 
The disparities between executive pay and worker wages further show the extent to 
which Japan has diverg
pay was 7.8 times higher in Japan than the average worker, and 25.8 times in the United States in 
1991, and this figure rose 11 times higher in Japan and an astounding 35 times larger in the 
                                                          
57 Basu, Hwang, Mitsudome & Weintrop, supra note 20, at 60; Masayuki Morikawa,infra note 68. 
58 Abe, Gaston & Kubo, supra note 52, at 381; Masao Nakamura & Syen T. Rebien, Corporate  social  responsibility  
and  corporate  governance:  Japanese  firms  and  selective  adaptation, 45 UBC Law Review 723, 758-59 (2012). 
59 Tokyo Stock Exch., Inc., TSE-­Listed  Companies  White  Paper   on  Corporate  Governance, 69 (February, 2013) 
http://www.tse.or.jp/rules/cg/white-paper/b7gje60000005ob1-att/b7gje6000003ukm8.pdf. 
60 In   Japan,   Underpaid-­and   Loving   It, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, 2011 (indicating $1.1 million) 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_28/b4186014341924.htm; Daisuke Wakabayashi, Japan's  
Executives   to   Reveal   Compensation   Under   New   Rules, Wall St. J., June 9, 2010, 
,http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703890904575296390830444072; Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & 
Curtis J. Milhaupt, supra note 11, at 127. 
61 Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Curtis J. Milhaupt, supra note 11, at 131-132;;  In  Japan,  Underpaid-­and  Loving  It, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, 2011 (noting that fewer than 300 executives  at Japan's 3,813 public companies 


















62 The CEO-worker pay disparity continued to worsen in the United States in the 
following years, reaching alarming proportions particularly when compared to the Japanese ratio: 
Table  8:  Ratio  of  CEO  Pay  to  the  Average  Worker63    
                                                                Country                                                                                                                            Total  Ratio  
  
Japan                            11:1                                                          
Canada                            20:1                                              
United States                                                        475:1 
  
Recent studies have confirmed that CEO-worker pay ratio in the United States and 
Canada remains extremely high. The pay gap between large company chief executives and 
average American workers has grown from 195-to-1 in 1993 to 354-to-1 in 2012.64 The average 
national pay for a non-supervisory US worker was reportedly $51,200 in 2012.65 Needless to say, 
these large pay disparities harm employee morale and productivity. The 2010 Dodd-Frank 
legislation requiring CEO-worker pay ratio disclosure was enacted to correct such huge disparity 
and executive excessiveness, but it has not yet been implemented after three years66 and has 
                                                          
62 Jackson, supra  note 52, at  292.   
63 Kroll, supra note 41. 
64 Anderson, Klinger & Pizzigati, supra note 5, at 4. 
65 Mark Gongloff, CEOs  Paid  273  Times  More  Than  Workers  in  2012:  Study, THE HUFFINGTON POST, June 26, 
2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/26/ceos-paid-times-more-than-workers_n_3504821.html 

















faced strong opposition from American corporations.67 In Canada, the average annual salary was 
68  
 
Interestingly, Japanese corporations have become some of the most competitive and 
efficient companies in the world while developing a pattern of low executive pay, low CEO-
worker pay ratio and heavy income taxes. This presents important challenges to Western beliefs 
Japanese regularly lecture the West on their short-sighted behavior. They ask how they will ever 
become competitive unless you are willing to make long-term investments investments that 
69 In particular, Canada and the 
United States may want to learn that even with lower salaries, higher tax levels, and greater 
monitoring/disclosure mandates, corporate lifestyle and business operations do not have to 
suffer. A critical factor in maintaining firm competitiveness with a pattern of low executive pay 
has been the uniqueness of the Japanese corporate governance system that provides effective 
monitoring and disclosure and aids in reducing high risk investments/business ventures. The 
following section further discusses the importance of this Japanese corporate governance system 
for controlling executive compensation. 
                                                          
67 -paid CEOs busted, bailed out or booted, study says. CEOs 
of U.S. large companies got about 354 times as much pay as the average American worker in 2012, CBC News, Aug 
30, 2013, http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/story/2013/08/30/business-executive-excess.html 
68 Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, supra note 7. 


















EXPLAINING  THE  PATTERN  OF  LOW  EXECUTIVE  PAY  IN  JAPAN 
The above review of the patterns of executive pay in Japan, Canada and the US once 
again confirms that excessive executive compensation is not a universal norm and has little to do 
with efficiency. Furthermore, the Japanese experience sheds light on the factors that may account 
for the development of low executive pay patterns. While the Japanese corporate governance 
system can be credited for the development of lower executive compensation practices, the 
Japanese business culture steers the governance of corporations towards a practice that is 
unfriendly to excessive executive pay. A business culture that does not tolerate excessiveness 
neither encourage greed is likely to both favor lower executive compensation practices and 
harness the corporate governance system to control executive excessiveness. 
 
The Japanese practice of paying lower compensations to executives appears to be 
consistent with a long-standing tradition of discouraging greed and shareholder value 
maximization as the dominant principles of running a company. Contemporary Japanese firms 
continue to share long-standing attitudes against greed and shareholder primacy in order to 
maintain social harmony and are often concerned about the long-term sustainability of the firm.70 
                                                          
70 Nakamura & Rebien, supra note 58, at 729. See also Michael E. Porter, Capital  Disadvantage:  America's  Failing  
Capital  Investment  System,  HARv. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 70 (claiming that Japanese owners look to the 
long-term); PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 

















Executives have customarily avoided standing out as highly compensated individuals.71 A recent 
study has, for example, found some evidence that executive compensation at Japanese firms with 
traditional statutory-auditor structures seems to be subject to an upper limit that executives 
carefully observe with the consequence of not receiving increases that would exceed the limit.72 
Moreover, this constraint on excessive executive compensation appears to be common to all 
Japanese managers regardless of whether they lead a firm with the traditional auditor system or 
the new committee system.73 Similarly, significant portion of executive compensation packages 
has traditionally been in the form of perquisites as opposed to salary, which has to some extent 
changed with the recent introduction of stock options in Japan.74 Even after stock options were 
legally allowed in 1997, the number of firms that adopted stock options increased until the mid-
2000s and since then has remained the same or decreased slightly.75 According to a Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry survey of approximately 30,000 large and medium-sized Japanese 
firms, only 1,505 firms or 5.4% of the total firms surveyed adopted stock options in 2009.76 As 
                                                          
71 Nakamura & Rebien, supra note 58, at  729 
72 Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Curtis J. Milhaupt, supra note 11, at 146. 
73 Ibid. at 156. 
74 Kato, Hideaki Kiyoshi, Michael Lemmon, Mi Luo & James Schallheim, An  Empirical  Examination  of  the  Costs  
and  Benefits  of  Executive  Stock  Options:  Evidence  from  Japan, 78 (2) JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 
435, 438-439 (2005). 
75 Masayuki Morikawa, Stock  Options  and  Productivity:  An  empirical  analysis  of  Japanese  firms. RIETI, The 
Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry, RIETI Discussion Paper Series 12-E-011 (February 2012) at 2, 
http://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/dp/12e011.pdf. 

















for TSE-listed companies, only 31.1.% (down 0.4%) of listed companies have introduced stock  
option  plans  as  of  February  2013  while  expressing    hesitation  and  resistance.77 
 
This unfriendly attitude to corporate greed and ensuing lower compensation practices 
Toyoda, reportedly earned 184 million yen ($1.9 million) in 2012, a 35 percent increase from the 
previous year. He is the lowest-
Akio Toyoda led Toyota to generate the highest return last year among the top five global 
automakers.78 
last year.79 
compensations when their companies perform poorly. For instance, in 2010, Toyoda rejected his 
bonus pay after a recall of more than 8 million cars worldwide, making his annual compensation 
80 Sony CEO Kazuo Hirai along 
with approximately 40 Sony senior executives voluntarily forwent annual bonuses for 2012 as 
81 More recently, many Japanese listed companies have 
                                                          
77 Tokyo Stock Exch., Inc., TSE-­Listed  Companies  White  Paper  on  Corporate  Governance, 64 (February, 2013), 
http://www.tse.or.jp/rules/cg/white-paper/b7gje60000005ob1-att/b7gje6000003ukm8.pdf. 
78 Mukai & Masatsugu, supra note 12. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Caroline Fairchild, Sony  CEO  among  40  Execs  to  Give  Up  Bonuses  as  Company  Struggles, THE HUFFINGTON 

















indicated that they  would  cut  officer  compensation  in  the  event  of  deteriorating  business  
performance.82  This contrasts with Western practices of paying excessive compensation even 
-
paid CEO in the United States and received $96.2 million, a 24 percent increase despite his 
83 This weak link between pay and performance has been 
recently proven with the finding that, in the past 20 years, nearly 40 per cent of the highest-paid 
CEOs in the U.S. have been bailed out, fired or arrested for illegal activities.84 
 
Such Japanese business culture has encouraged a clear responsibility of the corporation to 
its stakeholders.85 The prevalence of such strong stakeholder culture in Japan has also worked 
against the development of excessive executive compensation practices. The belief that, a 
company should not be run solely to protect the interest of shareholders or executives and the 
interests of multiple participants that have a stake and contribute to the sustainability of the 
company are also important,86 
into account a range of stakeholders, in addition to shareholders, while not having a fiduciary 
                                                          
82 Tokyo Stock Exch., Inc., TSE-­Listed  Companies  White  Paper  on  Corporate  Governance, 66 (February, 2013), 
http://www.tse.or.jp/rules/cg/white-paper/b7gje60000005ob1-att/b7gje6000003ukm8.pdf 
83 Caroline Fairchild, supra note 81.  
84 Anderson, Klinger & Pizzigati, supra note 5. 
85 Nakamura & Rebien, supra note 58, at 729. 
86 Porter, supra note 71, at 75 (claiming that Japanese governance process incorporates the interests of employees, 

















87 Such stakeholder culture influences the role and expectations of CEOs. The 
levels of competitiveness.  On August 1, 2001 the Financial Times reported details of the annual 
meeting of the International Corporate Governance Network which was held in Tokyo that year: 
Hiroshi  Okuda,  chairman  of  Toyota  Motor  Corporation  and  of   the  Japan  Federation  of  
Employers'   Associations   told   the   assembled   money   managers   that   it   would   be  
irresponsible   to  run  Japanese  companies  primarily   in   the   interests  of  shareholders.  His  
manner  of  doing  so  left  no  doubt  about  the  remaining  depth  of  Japanese  exceptionalism  
in   corporate   governa
junior  high  school   textbooks  say  about  corporate   social   responsibility.  Under  Japanese  
company   law,   they   explain,   shareholders   are   the   owners   of   the   corporation.   But   if  
corporations   are   run   exclusively   in   the   interests   of   shareholders,   the   business   will   be  
driven   to   pursue   short   -­term   profit   at   the   expense   of   employment   and   spending   on  
research   and   development.   To   be   sustainable,   children   are   told,   corporations   must  
nurture   relationships   with   stakeholders   such   as   suppliers,   employees   and   the   local  
community.  So  whatever   the   legal  position,   the   textbooks  declare,   the  corporation  does  
not  belong  to  its  owners.88  
 
interest, institutional investors, with a long-term stake and therefore interested in the long-tem 
sustainability of corporations, have been a driving force in maintaining lower compensation 
levels in Japan. Specifically, Japanese banks have played a critical role in controlling excessive 
compensation, particularly in keiretsu firms. The main bank is usually the top lender to, and one 
                                                          


















of the largest shareholders of, the firm.89 In such a position, banks have been able to monitor 
management via shareholder ownership and bank-appointed directors.90 Banks have been 
helped keep executive compensation at lower levels.91 CEOs of keiretsu firms are 
more subject to major shareholder monitoring and less able to use their power to increase their 
92 Some studies have found that executive compensation is lower in keiretsu 
firms than in non-keiretsu firms.93 Such shareholder monitoring is associated with the leading 
role of the main bank that has great control over the keiretsu member firms94 and helps reduce 
managerial opportunism.95 
 
                                                          
89 M. Aoki, Towards  an  economic  model  of  the  Japanese  firm, 28 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE 1 
(1990); Basu, Hwang, Mitsudome & Weintrop, supra note 20, at 58. 
90 Sakawa, Moriyama & Watanabel, supra note 25, at 596. 
91 H. Sakawa & N. Watanabel, Relationship  between  managerial  compensation  and  business  performance  in  Japan:  
New  evidence  using  micro  data, 22 ASIAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL 431, 451 (2008); Basu, Hwang, Mitsudome & 
Weintrop, supra note 20. 
92 Sunny Li Sun, Xia Zhao & Haibin Yang, Executive  compensation  in  Asia:  A  critical  review  and  outlook, 27 ASIA 
PAC. J. MANAG 775, 784 (2010); similarly T. Kato, Chief  executive  compensation  and  corporate  groups  in  Japan:  
new  evidence  from  micro  data, 15 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 455 
(1997). 
93 E. Berglof & E. Perotti, The  governance  structure  of  the  Japanese  financial  keiretsu, 36(2) JOURNAL OF 
FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 259 (1994); Kato, supra note 87 
; Basu, Hwang, 
Mitsudome & Weintrop, supra  note 20; Hideaki Sakawa & Naoki Watanabel, Executive  Compensation  and  Firm  
Performance  in  Japan:  The  Role  of  Keiretsu  Memberships  and  Bank-­Appointed  Monitors, 9 (8) JOURNAL OF 
MODERN ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING 1119, 1121 (2013). 
94 Sunny Li Sun, Xia Zhao & Haibin Yang, supra note 80, at 784; Kato, supra note 87. 


















However, after the deregulation of the financial system and corporate governance reforms 
in Japan and in the face of the pressures from global capital markets, Japanese banks appear to be 
gradually withdrawing from their traditional monitoring of firms.96 The adoption of committee 
systems and the increase of foreign ownership over the last decade are likely to affect the 
traditional bank-centered corporate governance systems with their higher bank ownership and 
bank-appointed directors.97 These changes may diminish the power of banks to control 
potentially excessive executive compensation in the future.98 For instance, according to the 2003 
reforms of the Commercial Code, firms were allowed to adopt the committee systems, including 
a compensation committee which is expected to design individual executive compensation and 
be composed mostly of outside directors.99 Similarly, the increasing presence of foreign 
shareholders puts pressure on existing executive compensation practices and may eventually 
result in spreading practices such as the wide use of stock options100 that may bring executive 
compensation closer to the excessiveness of Anglo-American standards.  
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In fact, preliminary evidence indicates that Japanese firms that have adopted U.S. board 
structures including committees have also adopted similar U.S. pay practices101 suggesting the 
development of higher executive compensation practices. Highest-paid executives at committee-
based firms receive some forty percent of their compensation in performance-sensitive payments 
such as bonuses and stock options whereas executives at firms with traditional governance 
structures receive less than twenty percent of their compensation in bonuses and stocks.102 Non-
Japanese executives earn about forty percent more than Japanese executives and receive fifty 
percent more of their compensation in the form of stock options in comparison to their Japanese 
counterparts.103 While this represents a recent change to the traditional pattern of low executive 
pay in some Japanese companies, it should be noted that only 112 public Japanese companies   
adopted the committee system as of April 2009,104 just 7% of the 152 firms that were required to 
disclose individual executive compensation in 2010 adopted committees105 and only 2.2% of all  
TSE-­Listed  Companies  are companies with committees as of February 2013.106 Similarly, the total 
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number of Japanese firms that have adopted stock options remains low107 and the structure of 
executive pay still relies very heavily on payments unrelated to performance notably salary.108 It 
thus remains to be seen whether the Japanese pattern of low executive pay will resist and survive 
the new pressures. 
In such a context in which banks, as lenders and major shareholders, have been active in 
controlling executive compensation, it should not be surprising to find competent boards that are 
also active in monitoring executives and are intolerant to excessive executive pay.Japanese 
boards are better able to think strategically and often provide a strong oversight while bringing  a 
wide range of relevant experiences to the boardroom.109 Taft and Gangaram maintain that 
ide themselves on the long-term solvency of the corporation and 
110 Yet, unlike their American 
counterp
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excessive compensation to be effective or efficient.111 Wealth concentration in the form of both 
increasing short-term shareholder returns and huge bonus for directors does not seem to be an 
imperative in the eyes of Japanese boards. In particular, Japanese boards that are smaller and 
have outside directors tend to pay lower compensations to their executives.112 Bank-appointed 
directors are active monitors of executives and executive compensation is both smaller and less 
sensitive to performance in firms with a main bank relationship or bank-appointed directors.113 
 
Consistent with a strong stakeholder culture, the interests of workers are given significant 
consideration and thus inform the decisions about the compensation of corporate executives.  The 
perception of corporate management as a group effort further encourages the need to relate CEO 
114This is indicative of the central place that employee 
welfare has in Japanese firms.115 
116 Japanese corporations 
are known for their commitment to lifetime employment,117 although this has not been applied 
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112 Basu, Hwang, Mitsudome & Weintrop, supra note 20, at 75. 
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equally to male and female workers and the gender wage gap remains high.118 Nevertheless, the 
citizenship of labor in addition to the financial commitment of capital.119 
 
when setting executive pay. Some studies have indicated that changes in Japanese executive base 
pay are linked to general movements in employee wages and salaries.120 According to a survey 
by the Employment System Research Center, approximately 70% of the surveyed firms indicated 
to firm performance and industry standards.121 In recent years, there has been significant public 
pressure to further narrow the gap between the salaries of top managers and average employees. 
Critics have suggested that the large cash reserves of many public companies should be used to 
pay higher salaries to workers.122  Similarly, stock options, albeit recent and modestly used, have 
been granted not only to executives but also to employees. A Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry survey of approximately 30,000 large and medium-sized Japanese firms indicates that 
70% or more of the total firms that have adopted stock options granted stock options to both 
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executives and employees during the 1998-2005 period.123 As of February 2013, a high number 
of statutory auditor and committee-based TSE-listed companies with stock option plans offer 
these plans mostly to employees and inside directors.124 Bonuses are also given to executives and 
million yen ($1.9 million) in 2012, a 35 percent increase from the previous year. He is the 
lowest-
profit has prompted the automaker to approve the biggest bonus for workers since 2008.125 
 
It would also be expected that executive bonuses will be lowered when employee 
bonuses are reduced in order to save labour cost and avoid massive lay-offs in tough economic 
times.126 The possibility of a promotion tournament that uses executive compensation also as a 
reward for a successful career after a series of employee competitions within Japanese 
corporations further reinforces the need to link executive pay to the wages of workers at lower 
levels.127 These corporate practices may reflect the strong commitment to social equality in 
Japan, which is an important cultural constraint both to control potential excessiveness in 
executive compensation and reduce the gap between the compensation of executives and 
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employees.128 In sum, this Japanese practice of tying executive pay to the salary of workers helps 
keep executive compensation lower while considerably narrowing the pay gap between CEOs 
and average Japanese workers down to some of the smallest in the world and distributing 
corporate gains more equally. 
-
nd that it 
is the board of directors. But it almost never is. Basically, the board of directors of most 
129 Most 
endas, compensation packages and 
130 Corporate board oversight has 
 dysfunction of too many boards: selecting 
inadequate CEOs in the first place; failing to advise and mentor executives and avoiding realistic 
131 As a result, excessive executive compensation and short-term profit 
maximization dominate corporate decisions to the detriment of the long-term sustainability of 
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companies and the well-being of employees. Countrywide Financials and the compensation paid 
to its CEO Angelo Mozilo is one of the most obvious examples of that problem: 
Mr. Mozilo ran roughshod over his board, while receiving more than $200 million in 
salary and bonuses in 2007, while Countrywide, the very same year announced a $1.2 
billion dollar loss in the third quarter and a $422 million loss in the fourth quarter. As the 
stock dropped 80% during this time, Mr. Mozilo was paid $2 million and 





This paper has discussed the pattern of low executive compensation in Japan. It was 
argued that the activism of long-term oriented institutional investors such as banks and the 
informal tying of executive pay to worker welfare in the context of a culture of intolerance to 
excessive executive compensation have been critical in the development of a pattern of low 
executive pay in Japan. The Japanese experience also reveals that lower executive compensation 
does not result in compromising firm performance and is a necessary condition to build a 
stakeholder-friendly corporation. These findings suggest some lessons for regulating excessive 
compensation practices indicate that the presence of more effective internal controls may help in 
controlling excessiveness in executive pay. In particular, the active role of institutional 
                                                          

















shareholders with a long-term orientation and the adoption of a tougher board oversight in the 
context of a culture that is unfriendly to greed and friendly to stakeholders would be ideal, but 
this requires fundamental changes to existing corporate beliefs in the West. Furthermore, the 
and some form of employee participation in the governance of corporations should also be given 
serious consideration as it may help monitor the implementation of such tying while fostering a 
stakeholder culture.  
 
Further research is needed in several respects. This work is based on a review of the 
literature on the determinants of executive compensation in Japan and more empirical 
investigations would be ideal to expand some of the findings associated with the pattern of low 
executive compensation. It is also important to explore in a more in-depth manner both the 
influence of the Japanese business culture on the development of executive compensation 
practices and the extent to which the pressures from the globalization of the capital market can 
transform such practices in the near future. 
